What happened at the Battle of Medina de Rioseco?
On 14 July 1808, early in the Peninsular War, Marshal Jean-Baptiste Bessières with about 14,000 French troops defeated a larger Spanish force under Generals Gregorio de la Cuesta and Joaquín Blake outside Medina de Rioseco in Castile. Cuesta had placed his two wings so far apart that they could not see each other, and Bessières beat them one after the other. The victory kept open the French road between Madrid and France, and Joseph Bonaparte entered Madrid as king six days later.1
The Battle of Medina de Rioseco was lost before it began. On 14 July a French army of about 14,000 men under Marshal Jean-Baptiste Bessières met a larger Spanish force on a gentle slope outside the small Castilian town. The Spanish commander had placed his two wings so far apart that they could not see each other, and Bessières beat them one after the other.2
Background: Spain rises
In May 1808 Napoleon forced the Spanish king Charles IV and his son Ferdinand to give up the crown at Bayonne and named his own brother, Joseph Bonaparte, king of Spain. Madrid had already risen against the French on 2 May, and although the rising was crushed, insurrections broke out in the provinces across the country.3
In Valladolid the rebels turned to the governor-general of Old Castile, Gregorio García de la Cuesta, an elderly general. He at first refused to lead them and, as Oman tells the story, is said to have given way only when the rope was already around his neck. His raw Army of Castile was routed at Cabezón on 12 June, but he was not ready to give up, and he appealed to the juntas of Asturias and Galicia for help.4

The Asturians sent only two battalions. The Junta of Galicia agreed to send most of its much better army under General Joaquín Blake.5
Armies and commanders
Sir Charles Oman, the historian of the war, has the two armies meeting at Villalpando on 10 July; Napier places the junction at Benavente. As the senior officer, Cuesta took command of the combined force and planned to cut the French road between Madrid and France. Oman also notes that a third Galician division was left behind at Benavente, and that by calling in all the troops available the Spaniards might have had about 40,000 men instead of 22,000.6
Oman sets out what Cuesta actually had: Blake about 15,000 infantry, 150 cavalry and 20 guns, Cuesta himself about 6,000 infantry and 550 cavalry but not a single gun. The Fondation Napoléon's biography of Bessières, who commanded the French 2nd Corps from his headquarters at Burgos, puts the Spanish threat at 40,000 men, a figure close to Oman's estimate of what might have been but far above what was actually on the field.7

Napoleon and his commanders in Madrid had expected just such a blow and sent Bessières reinforcements, among them troops of the Imperial Guard and a division of veterans under General Mouton. The size of the French army differs from source to source: about 14,000 in the Fondation Napoléon and about 13,700 in Oman, who added up the units present.8

The battle in phases
According to Oman, on the evening of 13 July the French light cavalry of General Antoine Lasalle found the Spanish outposts near Medina de Rioseco. Bessières marched before dawn the next morning and found the Spaniards drawn up on rising ground east of the town.9
Cuesta had chosen a poor position: a gentle slope in front of the town, open to cavalry, with no protection on its flanks. Worse, he split his army. Blake, with one Galician division and the vanguard, held part of the plateau of Valdecuevas. Cuesta, with his Army of Castile and another Galician division, stood nearly a mile away behind Blake's left, so far back that the two halves could not see each other. Oman found the deployment impossible to explain. The Spanish historian Toreno, a contemporary of the war, guessed that Cuesta wanted the glory for himself: to let his rival be beaten and then come up to save the day.10
Bessières saw the chance at once. He sent five battalions under Mouton to keep Cuesta busy, while fifteen battalions under Generals Merle and Sabathier attacked Blake. For about an hour the fight on Blake's front hung in the balance.11
Turning point: Lasalle in the gap
Then Bessières sent Lasalle's cavalry into the empty ground between the two Spanish wings and onto Blake's open left flank. Blake's line, caught from the side, collapsed within minutes, and the French infantry came on with the bayonet. A single battalion from Navarre formed square and held up the pursuit long enough for the rest of Blake's troops to escape.12

Cuesta should now have retreated. Instead, as the French appeared on the heights, he sent the Galician division with him to attack uphill against the victorious French, though Toreno records that some said the division attacked on its own initiative. The attack reached their line in the center and took four guns before it was thrown back with heavy losses. Only then did Cuesta order his Army of Castile to fall back through the town.13
Aftermath
The French had been marching and fighting since two in the morning, and Bessières did not press the pursuit far. Oman counts the Galician losses at over 3,000: nearly 400 killed, over 500 wounded and some 1,200 prisoners, with more than a thousand recruits scattered, against just 155 in the Army of Castile; the French, by Foy's figures, lost 105 killed and 300 wounded. The other historians of the war count differently: Toreno puts the Spanish loss at over 4,000 killed, wounded, captured and missing and the French at about 300 killed and over 700 wounded, while Napier gives the French 50 killed and 300 wounded.14
Blake took his army back to the passes into Galicia and Cuesta withdrew to León. The French road between Madrid and France was safe again, and Joseph Bonaparte could go on to Madrid, which he entered on 20 July.15
The French triumph did not last. On 23 July a French army under General Dupont laid down its arms to the Spaniards at Bailén in Andalusia, and at the start of August the French abandoned Madrid and fell back to the Ebro.16 › Battle of Zornoza, 1808
Legacy and memory
For Oman, the Spanish soldiers had no reason to be ashamed of their conduct; the blame lay with their commander, whose astounding tactical errors had made the way easy for Bessières. Toreno had reached the same verdict long before: he blamed the defeat on Cuesta's obstinate blindness and ignorance and on the discord between the two generals, while the raw troops had fought long and bravely.17
Cuesta went on to command Spanish armies again, and Oman, remembering Cabezón, Medina de Rioseco and later Medellín, wished his consent to take up arms had been delayed a few minutes longer.18 › Napoleon Bonaparte
Notes
A number in the text points to a note; each note names the works that paragraph draws on, listed in full under Sources.
- Fondation Napoléon, “BESSIÈRES, Jean-Baptiste, duc d'Istrie (1768-1813), maréchal”; Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsular War. ↩
- Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsular War; José María Queipo de Llano, Historia del levantamiento, guerra y revolución de España. ↩
- William Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France; José María Queipo de Llano, Historia del levantamiento, guerra y revolución de España. ↩
- Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsular War; José María Queipo de Llano, Historia del levantamiento, guerra y revolución de España. ↩
- Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsular War; José María Queipo de Llano, Historia del levantamiento, guerra y revolución de España. ↩
- Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsular War; José María Queipo de Llano, Historia del levantamiento, guerra y revolución de España; William Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France. ↩
- Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsular War; Fondation Napoléon, “BESSIÈRES, Jean-Baptiste, duc d'Istrie (1768-1813), maréchal”. ↩
- Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsular War; Fondation Napoléon, “BESSIÈRES, Jean-Baptiste, duc d'Istrie (1768-1813), maréchal”. ↩
- Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsular War; William Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France. ↩
- Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsular War; José María Queipo de Llano, Historia del levantamiento, guerra y revolución de España. ↩
- Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsular War; José María Queipo de Llano, Historia del levantamiento, guerra y revolución de España. ↩
- Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsular War; José María Queipo de Llano, Historia del levantamiento, guerra y revolución de España. ↩
- Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsular War; José María Queipo de Llano, Historia del levantamiento, guerra y revolución de España. ↩
- Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsular War; José María Queipo de Llano, Historia del levantamiento, guerra y revolución de España; William Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France. ↩
- Maximilien Foy, Histoire de la guerre de la Péninsule sous Napoléon; William Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France. ↩
- Maximilien Foy, Histoire de la guerre de la Péninsule sous Napoléon; William Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France; Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsular War. ↩
- Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsular War; José María Queipo de Llano, Historia del levantamiento, guerra y revolución de España. ↩
- Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsular War. ↩
Sources
- Fondation Napoléon, napoleon.org, “BESSIÈRES, Jean-Baptiste, duc d'Istrie (1768-1813), maréchal” (in French)
- Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsular War, vol. 1 (1902), Project Gutenberg, “A History of the Peninsular War, Vol. 1, 1807-1809”, chapter on Medina de Rio Seco
- José María Queipo de Llano, conde de Toreno, Historia del levantamiento, guerra y revolución de España, vol. 1 (Madrid: Tomás Jordán, 1835), books II to IV, especially pp. 216 to 217 and 370 to 382, Internet Archive, “Historia del levantamiento, guerra y revolución de España, tomo 1” (in Spanish)
- William Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France, vol. 1 (London: John Murray, 1828), books I and II, Rio Seco at pp. 103 to 109, Internet Archive, “History of the War in the Peninsula, vol. 1”
- Maximilien Foy, Histoire de la guerre de la Péninsule sous Napoléon, vol. 4 (Paris: Baudouin frères, 1827), pp. 28 to 29, 46 to 47 and 297 to 298, Internet Archive, “Histoire de la guerre de la Péninsule sous Napoléon, tome 4” (in French)






