What was the Battle of Latakia?
The Battle of Latakia was fought off the Syrian port of Latakia on the first night of the Yom Kippur War, 6 to 7 October 1973. Five Israeli missile boats sank a Syrian torpedo boat, a minesweeper and two missile boats and drove a third missile boat ashore, without loss. It was the first naval battle in which both sides fired anti-ship missiles, and the Israelis won by decoying the longer-ranged Soviet-built Styx missiles with chaff and electronic countermeasures.1
The battle lasted a single night, but it was the first test in combat of a new kind of war at sea, fought by small fast boats armed with guided missiles and defended by electronic deception.2
Background
In 1967, months after the Six-Day War, Egyptian missile boats off Port Said fired Soviet-made Styx missiles at the Israeli destroyer Eilat and sank her. Forty-seven of her crew were killed. The Styx was a radar-homing missile, and the sinking showed that a small missile boat could destroy a destroyer.3 › The Suez Crisis, 1956
The lesson was repeated in December 1971, when Indian missile boats armed with the same missile raided Karachi and sank a Pakistani destroyer. By then the Egyptian and Syrian navies had Soviet missile boats of their own.4
The Israeli Navy had answered with a weapon of its own design, the Gabriel, and with small boats to carry it. The Jewish Virtual Library describes the navy before this as a fifth-rate fleet of hand-me-downs. The boats were built in France, at Cherbourg: twelve were ordered, but after the war of 1967 President Charles de Gaulle imposed an arms embargo on Israel, and only seven had been delivered.5

The last five boats, already paid for, stayed in Cherbourg. Adm. Mordecai Limon, the head of Israel's arms purchasing mission in France, organized their departure behind a commercial cover. On Christmas Eve 1969 the five boats slipped out of the harbor. They were identified only as they passed Gibraltar, and they reached Haifa on the last day of the year.6
Armies and commanders
On paper the odds were poor. The Styx had about twice the range of the Gabriel, roughly 25 nautical miles against 12, so a Syrian boat could fire long before an Israeli boat could reply. The Gabriel had never been fired in anger, and the Israeli defenses against the Styx, chaff and electronic jammers developed in Israel, had never been tested in a real engagement. If they failed, the boats would be easy prey.7

The Syrian navy fielded Soviet-built missile boats of two types, the Osa and the Komar, both armed with the Styx. Against them the Israelis sent Sa'ar-class boats carrying Gabriels and guns. Their tactic, worked out in exercises before the war, was to charge the enemy head on, let him fire at maximum range, defeat his missiles with deception, and strike once within Gabriel range.8
Accounts differ on who commanded at sea. The Jewish Virtual Library names Michael Barkai as the officer in charge of the operation. Col. (res.) Udi Erel, then a young operations officer of the missile boat flotilla, told JNS that the flotilla commander was Micha Ram.9
The battle in phases
Egypt and Syria attacked Israel on the afternoon of 6 October 1973, the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur. That night the navy sent five missile boats north along the Syrian coast with orders to draw the Syrian navy into battle and destroy its missile boats.10 › The Yom Kippur War, 1973
The first contact was a Syrian torpedo boat. Its gunfire did little harm, and the Israelis sank it with their guns.11
Heading toward the coast, the boats met a Syrian minesweeper, and the boat Reshef sank it with missiles. The Jewish Virtual Library describes a single Gabriel striking it squarely at about eighteen kilometers; John Schulte, in a study for the US Naval Postgraduate School, counts three Gabriel hits. The Israelis concluded that the torpedo boat and the minesweeper had been pickets or decoys.12

Off Latakia three more contacts appeared: one Osa and two Komar missile boats coming out to fight. They opened fire from a range at which the Israelis could not reply.13
Turning point
As the Styx missiles closed, the Israeli boats fired chaff rockets and switched on their jammers, which sent false radar signals to the incoming missiles. Every one of them missed: they flew harmlessly overhead or dove into the sea. Schulte, followed by the Center for International Maritime Security, counts eight Styx fired in this phase, all decoyed.14
Now the Israelis closed at full speed. They fired their Gabriels, and Schulte counts eleven launched in the whole battle, of which six hit. One Komar and the Osa were sunk. The second Komar was driven onto the shore. Abraham Rabinovich, the historian of the Israeli missile boats, writes that its commander beached it so that he and his crew could escape; Schulte records that it was later destroyed by gunfire.15
The Israelis came home without loss. Five Syrian vessels had been sunk or destroyed, and the first battle in history between missile-armed ships had gone to the side with the shorter-ranged missile.16
Aftermath
On the night of 8 October the same tactics were repeated off Baltim on the Egyptian coast: the Egyptian Osa boats fired their Styx missiles near maximum range and turned away, the Israelis pursued, and three Egyptian boats were sunk. When Israeli boats returned to Latakia a few nights later, the Syrian boats fired from behind merchant ships lying off the port.17
After these battles the Syrian and Egyptian navies kept close to their harbors. Not one Styx missile hit an Israeli vessel in the whole war, although the count of missiles fired varies: Schulte gives 47, with reports of as many as 55, the Center for International Maritime Security gives 52, and Rabinovich 54.18

The war itself was fought out on land and in the air. When the Soviet Union began to resupply Egypt and Syria, the United States opened an emergency supply line to Israel. The Center for International Maritime Security judges that the naval battles played almost no part in the outcome of the war, but that they began a technological and tactical revolution at sea.19
Legacy and memory
Latakia proved that missiles fired by small boats could be beaten by deception. The Jewish Virtual Library writes that even Arab navies later adopted the countermeasure techniques the Israelis used there, and the Center for International Maritime Security that chaff, jamming and radar-absorbing coatings became necessities for warships.20
For the Israeli Navy the battle became a founding story. The Jewish Virtual Library sees it as the moment the navy proved itself at a time when even the air force and the armored corps could not, and JNS calls it a staple of the navy's heritage.21
History returned to the same harbor in December 2024. After the fall of the Assad regime, Israeli Navy missile boats destroyed 15 vessels of the former Syrian navy at the port of Latakia and the nearby bay of Minet el-Beida.22
Notes
A number in the text points to a note; each note names the works that paragraph draws on, listed in full under Sources.
- Jewish Virtual Library, “Yom Kippur War: The Battle of Latakia”; Christian Heller, “The Impact of Insignificance: Naval Developments from the Yom Kippur War”, CIMSEC; John C. Schulte, An Analysis of the Historical Effectiveness of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles in Littoral Warfare (Naval Postgraduate School, 1994); JNS (Jewish News Syndicate), “How Israel destroyed Assad's Syrian navy”. ↩
- Christian Heller, “The Impact of Insignificance: Naval Developments from the Yom Kippur War”, CIMSEC; Jewish Virtual Library, “Yom Kippur War: The Battle of Latakia”. ↩
- John C. Schulte, An Analysis of the Historical Effectiveness of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles in Littoral Warfare (Naval Postgraduate School, 1994); Christian Heller, “The Impact of Insignificance: Naval Developments from the Yom Kippur War”, CIMSEC; Abraham Rabinovich, “The Boats of Cherbourg”, Tablet (2019). ↩
- John C. Schulte, An Analysis of the Historical Effectiveness of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles in Littoral Warfare (Naval Postgraduate School, 1994); Christian Heller, “The Impact of Insignificance: Naval Developments from the Yom Kippur War”, CIMSEC. ↩
- Jewish Virtual Library, “Yom Kippur War: The Battle of Latakia”; Abraham Rabinovich, “Forty Christmases ago”, Jewish Journal (2009); France 3 Normandie, “Cherbourg Haïfa, une histoire de vedettes”; Abraham Rabinovich, “The Boats of Cherbourg”, Tablet (2019). ↩
- France 3 Normandie, “Cherbourg Haïfa, une histoire de vedettes”; Abraham Rabinovich, “Forty Christmases ago”, Jewish Journal (2009); Abraham Rabinovich, “The Boats of Cherbourg”, Tablet (2019). ↩
- Jewish Virtual Library, “Yom Kippur War: The Battle of Latakia”; John C. Schulte, An Analysis of the Historical Effectiveness of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles in Littoral Warfare (Naval Postgraduate School, 1994); Christian Heller, “The Impact of Insignificance: Naval Developments from the Yom Kippur War”, CIMSEC; Abraham Rabinovich, “The Boats of Cherbourg”, Tablet (2019). ↩
- John C. Schulte, An Analysis of the Historical Effectiveness of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles in Littoral Warfare (Naval Postgraduate School, 1994); Jewish Virtual Library, “Yom Kippur War: The Battle of Latakia”; Christian Heller, “The Impact of Insignificance: Naval Developments from the Yom Kippur War”, CIMSEC. ↩
- Jewish Virtual Library, “Yom Kippur War: The Battle of Latakia”; JNS (Jewish News Syndicate), “How Israel destroyed Assad's Syrian navy”. ↩
- Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Yom Kippur War”; Christian Heller, “The Impact of Insignificance: Naval Developments from the Yom Kippur War”, CIMSEC; Jewish Virtual Library, “Yom Kippur War: The Battle of Latakia”. ↩
- Jewish Virtual Library, “Yom Kippur War: The Battle of Latakia”; John C. Schulte, An Analysis of the Historical Effectiveness of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles in Littoral Warfare (Naval Postgraduate School, 1994); Christian Heller, “The Impact of Insignificance: Naval Developments from the Yom Kippur War”, CIMSEC. ↩
- Jewish Virtual Library, “Yom Kippur War: The Battle of Latakia”; Christian Heller, “The Impact of Insignificance: Naval Developments from the Yom Kippur War”, CIMSEC; John C. Schulte, An Analysis of the Historical Effectiveness of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles in Littoral Warfare (Naval Postgraduate School, 1994). ↩
- Jewish Virtual Library, “Yom Kippur War: The Battle of Latakia”; Christian Heller, “The Impact of Insignificance: Naval Developments from the Yom Kippur War”, CIMSEC; John C. Schulte, An Analysis of the Historical Effectiveness of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles in Littoral Warfare (Naval Postgraduate School, 1994); Abraham Rabinovich, “The Boats of Cherbourg”, Tablet (2019). ↩
- Jewish Virtual Library, “Yom Kippur War: The Battle of Latakia”; John C. Schulte, An Analysis of the Historical Effectiveness of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles in Littoral Warfare (Naval Postgraduate School, 1994); Christian Heller, “The Impact of Insignificance: Naval Developments from the Yom Kippur War”, CIMSEC; Abraham Rabinovich, “The Boats of Cherbourg”, Tablet (2019). ↩
- John C. Schulte, An Analysis of the Historical Effectiveness of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles in Littoral Warfare (Naval Postgraduate School, 1994); Christian Heller, “The Impact of Insignificance: Naval Developments from the Yom Kippur War”, CIMSEC; Abraham Rabinovich, “Forty Christmases ago”, Jewish Journal (2009); Abraham Rabinovich, “The Boats of Cherbourg”, Tablet (2019); Jewish Virtual Library, “Yom Kippur War: The Battle of Latakia”. ↩
- Christian Heller, “The Impact of Insignificance: Naval Developments from the Yom Kippur War”, CIMSEC; JNS (Jewish News Syndicate), “How Israel destroyed Assad's Syrian navy”; Abraham Rabinovich, “Forty Christmases ago”, Jewish Journal (2009). ↩
- John C. Schulte, An Analysis of the Historical Effectiveness of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles in Littoral Warfare (Naval Postgraduate School, 1994); Christian Heller, “The Impact of Insignificance: Naval Developments from the Yom Kippur War”, CIMSEC; Abraham Rabinovich, “Forty Christmases ago”, Jewish Journal (2009). ↩
- Jewish Virtual Library, “Yom Kippur War: The Battle of Latakia”; Christian Heller, “The Impact of Insignificance: Naval Developments from the Yom Kippur War”, CIMSEC; John C. Schulte, An Analysis of the Historical Effectiveness of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles in Littoral Warfare (Naval Postgraduate School, 1994); Abraham Rabinovich, “The Boats of Cherbourg”, Tablet (2019). ↩
- Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Yom Kippur War”; Christian Heller, “The Impact of Insignificance: Naval Developments from the Yom Kippur War”, CIMSEC. ↩
- Jewish Virtual Library, “Yom Kippur War: The Battle of Latakia”; Christian Heller, “The Impact of Insignificance: Naval Developments from the Yom Kippur War”, CIMSEC. ↩
- Jewish Virtual Library, “Yom Kippur War: The Battle of Latakia”; JNS (Jewish News Syndicate), “How Israel destroyed Assad's Syrian navy”. ↩
- The Times of Israel, “In historic campaign across Syria, IDF says it destroyed 80% of Assad regime's military”; JNS (Jewish News Syndicate), “How Israel destroyed Assad's Syrian navy”. ↩
Sources
- Jewish Virtual Library, “Yom Kippur War: The Battle of Latakia”
- Christian Heller, Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), “The Impact of Insignificance: Naval Developments from the Yom Kippur War”
- John C. Schulte, An Analysis of the Historical Effectiveness of Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles in Littoral Warfare, master's thesis (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, September 1994), pp. 3 to 8
- JNS (Jewish News Syndicate), “How Israel destroyed Assad's Syrian navy”, with an interview with Col. (res.) Udi Erel
- Abraham Rabinovich, Tablet, 24 December 2019, “The Boats of Cherbourg”, adapted from his book of the same name
- Abraham Rabinovich, author of The Boats of Cherbourg, Jewish Journal, 19 December 2009, “Forty Christmases ago”
- France 3 Normandie (franceinfo), “Documentaire inédit: Cherbourg Haïfa, une histoire de vedettes”
- Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Yom Kippur War”
- The Times of Israel, 10 December 2024, “In historic campaign across Syria, IDF says it destroyed 80% of Assad regime's military”






