What are the greatest military blunders in history?
Hitler's refusal to let the encircled 6th Army break out of Stalingrad in 1942 tops our ranking: it cost Germany a whole field army. Next come Napoleon's long wait in Moscow in 1812, Varus' march into the Teutoburg Forest in AD 9, the Arnhem landings of 1944 and King Guy's waterless march to Hattin in 1187.
A blunder is not the same thing as a defeat. Armies lose to better enemies, to weather and to plain chance; this list counts only decisions by commanders, on the battlefield or in a campaign, that historians broadly call avoidable and that turned a hard position into a disaster. Starting a war is a political choice and is left out, and so are defeats won mainly by the enemy's skill. The fifteen blunders below are ranked by score, with most weight on how well known each one is; how we chose and ranked them is explained after the list. The battles with the highest death tolls are in our guide to the deadliest battles in history.
1 Stalingrad, 1942
- Where
- Stalingrad (today Volgograd), on the Volga, Soviet Union
- War
- World War II, Eastern Front
- Decision
- Hitler forbids the encircled German 6th Army to break out and relies on Göring's promise to supply it from the air, November 1942
- Warnings
- Paulus asked to break out; studies had shown that an airlift could not supply the army
- Cost
- 6th Army destroyed: about 150,000 dead in the pocket, some 91,000 captured, perhaps 5,000 to 6,000 came home
By mid-November 1942 the German 6th Army under Friedrich Paulus held about 90 percent of Stalingrad. On 19 November the Red Army struck from the northwest and the south, and within three days about 250,000 Germans and more than 30,000 Romanian and Soviet auxiliaries were trapped in a pocket some 40 by 50 km. Paulus asked permission to break out to the west. Hitler, who had made the city a symbol of German will, refused.1
Instead he trusted Hermann Göring's promise that the Luftwaffe could supply the army from the air. Göring offered 300 tons a day, although studies had already shown that an airlift was impossible for lack of transport aircraft, fighter cover and decent weather; the pocket received about 90 tons a day. Germany's national history museum says the 300 to 400 tons needed daily were never delivered. Erich von Manstein's relief attack came within 48 km and was called off, and on 23 December Hitler renewed the order to hold. Paulus surrendered on 31 January 1943. About 150,000 Germans had died in the pocket; of some 91,000 prisoners, only 5,000 to 6,000 ever came home. Myth vs fact: Göring's boast often takes the blame alone, but the decision to stand was Hitler's, against his general's request, and historians also fault Paulus for obeying when other army commanders in similar straits did not.2
Why it ranks here: It is No. 1 because it is the only blunder here with full marks for recognition, cost, memory and certainty: one refusal, on the record, cost Germany a whole field army. It drops a point only on clarity, because the encirclement itself was a Soviet achievement, not a German mistake.
2 Russia, 1812
- Where
- Moscow and the road back to the Niemen, Russian Empire
- War
- Napoleonic Wars, French invasion of Russia
- Decision
- Napoleon stays in burned Moscow for more than five weeks, from mid-September to 19 October 1812, waiting for a peace offer from Tsar Alexander I
- Warnings
- Caulaincourt refused to make a new approach to the tsar, saying it would be in vain; falling back to winter at Smolensk was one of the options weighed
- Cost
- Of some 615,000 men, fewer than 100,000 came back; about 380,000 dead (estimate)
Napoleon invaded Russia in June 1812 with a Grande Armée that World History Encyclopedia puts at 615,000 men. Heat, disease and desertion cost him about 100,000 before the first big battle, and after Borodino the Russian army withdrew intact. He entered an almost empty Moscow in mid-September, and fires burned it for six days.3
Then he waited. His peace overtures went unanswered; Caulaincourt, once his ambassador in St Petersburg, refused to make another approach, saying it would be in vain, and Alexander had said he would not negotiate while a single French soldier remained in Russia. Kutuzov let the talk run on to win time. Napoleon weighed falling back to winter at Smolensk and chose to wait. He left only on 19 October, with about 100,000 men, horses not shod for ice and soldiers not equipped for the cold. Fewer than 100,000 of the whole army came back across the Niemen; about 380,000 lay dead. On the sledge journey home he told Caulaincourt: “Everything turned out badly because I stayed too long at Moscow.” Myth vs fact: the winter did not destroy the army on its own; the first heavy snow fell in early November, when the army was already a fraction of the one that crossed the Niemen.4
Why it ranks here: Full marks for recognition, cost and memory: the retreat from Moscow ruined the army on which Napoleon's empire rested. Only the conduct of the campaign is scored, not the decision to invade; it loses a point on clarity, because Russian strategy and the weather share the blame with the long halt, and one on certainty, because the loss figures vary from source to source.
3 Teutoburg Forest, AD 9
- Where
- Probably near Kalkriese, Lower Saxony, Germany
- War
- Roman wars in Germania
- Decision
- Publius Quinctilius Varus ignores warnings of Arminius' plot and leads three legions on a march through forest and bog
- Warnings
- Segestes revealed the plot and asked Varus to arrest the plotters (Velleius, Tacitus); Varus rebuked those who urged caution (Cassius Dio)
- Cost
- Three legions with auxiliaries, perhaps 10,000 to 15,000 men (modern estimate), destroyed; Rome later gave up Germania
In AD 9 Publius Quinctilius Varus governed Germania as if it were already a quiet province; Velleius Paterculus says he behaved like a magistrate in a city forum, not a general in the heart of Germany. Arminius, a Cheruscan noble with Roman citizenship, built a conspiracy. Segestes, another chief, revealed it and demanded that the plotters be put in chains; Varus refused to believe him. Tacitus confirms the warning, given at a last banquet, and Cassius Dio says Varus rebuked those who urged caution.5
In September, marching to winter quarters with three legions and auxiliaries, perhaps 10,000 to 15,000 men, Varus believed Arminius' false news of a rising and turned off his route. Dio describes a column strung out among wagons and servants in rain and forest, attacked from all sides for three or four days until Varus took his own life. At Kalkriese, probably one of the sites, the road ran through a corridor about 1 km wide between a hill and a great bog. Myth vs fact: the turf wall found there was long read as the Germans' ambush line, but the Kalkriese museum now says new digs point to a Roman marching camp that the Germans overran, the wall most likely belonging to a Germanic farmstead. Rome came back with eight legions and gave up in AD 16.6
Why it ranks here: Full marks for recognition, cost and memory: it ended Rome's plans for Germania and fed German national identity like few other events. It loses a point on clarity, because the trap was Arminius' achievement as much as Varus' error, and two on certainty, because the warnings come from Roman writers who needed a culprit.7
4 Arnhem, 1944
- Where
- Arnhem and Oosterbeek, the Netherlands
- War
- World War II, Operation Market Garden
- Decision
- The British 1st Airborne Division is landed 7 to 9 miles (about 11 to 14 km) from its objective, and the operation goes ahead despite signs of German armor
- Warnings
- Major Brian Urquhart, intelligence officer at 1st Airborne Corps, reported armor near Arnhem and the distance to the bridge; he was sent on medical leave
- Cost
- Of about 10,000 men landed, about 2,100 ferried back; some 7,500 dead or captured
Operation Market Garden, launched on 17 September 1944, was an Allied plan to seize a chain of Dutch bridges with airborne troops so that XXX Corps could drive across the Rhine. The far bridge, at Arnhem, went to the British 1st Airborne Division and the Polish parachute brigade. Their landing zones lay about 11 km (7 miles) from the bridge by the National Army Museum's measure; the Airborne Assault Museum says the paratroopers came down nine miles west of Arnhem.8
The warnings were there. Major Brian Urquhart, chief intelligence officer at 1st Airborne Corps, raised German armor seen on reconnaissance photographs and reported by the Dutch resistance, the distance from the landing zones and the narrow roads; the concerns went up to command level, the operation went ahead, and he was put on medical leave. The Spectator's obituary says he repeatedly warned outraged superiors of disaster. Only about 750 men reached the bridge, holding it for three days and four nights. On 24 and 25 September about 2,100 men were ferried back across the Rhine; some 7,500 were dead or prisoners. Myth vs fact: the National Army Museum writes that intelligence failed to detect the tanks, but Urquhart's case shows the warning existed and was set aside, which is why Arnhem counts as a blunder, not just bad luck.9
Why it ranks here: Full marks for recognition, memory and certainty: the decision and the warnings are on record. Cost is 3, because it delayed the Rhine crossing by six months but did not lose the war, and clarity 4, because the single narrow road that slowed XXX Corps threatened the plan whatever the landing zones.10
5 Hattin, 1187
- Where
- The Horns of Hattin, west of the Sea of Galilee, in present-day Israel
- War
- Saladin's war against the Crusader states
- Decision
- King Guy of Lusignan leaves the springs of Saffuriya to relieve Tiberias, marching his army across waterless hills in July
- Warnings
- Raymond of Tripoli, lord of Tiberias, told the council not to march (Ibn al-Athir); the king had called out almost every fighting man in the kingdom
- Cost
- The kingdom's field army, perhaps 20,000 men (Britannica), destroyed; Jerusalem surrendered on 2 October 1187
In the summer of 1187 Saladin invaded the Kingdom of Jerusalem and attacked Tiberias, by Ibn al-Athir's account only to draw the Franks out to battle. King Guy of Lusignan had called out almost every fighting man in the kingdom, perhaps 20,000 by Britannica's estimate. At the council, Ibn al-Athir writes, Raymond of Tripoli, lord of Tiberias, whose wife was in its citadel, said he would rather lose the town than the army: Saladin could not stay long, and the Franks would retake it. Reynald of Châtillon accused him of siding with the Muslims, and the generals decided to advance.11
On 3 July the army left the springs of Saffuriya. Once past the water, it was harried by Saladin's skirmishers in the heat and camped for the night without water, ringed by smoking fires. On 4 July, pushing for the lake, the army broke apart and was driven onto the Horns of Hattin. Guy was captured and the relic of the True Cross was taken. With its army gone the kingdom collapsed, and Jerusalem surrendered on 2 October. Myth vs fact: Raymond is remembered as the wise counselor ignored, but the Frankish chronicler Ernoul calls the waterless halt of 3 July Raymond's bad advice.12
Why it ranks here: Full marks for clarity and cost: one march against advice given at the council lost the army and, within three months, Jerusalem. Recognition and memory are a point lower, and certainty is 3 because every account of the council comes from a partisan writer. It ties Dien Bien Phu on points, recognition and cost and goes first as the older blunder.
6 Dien Bien Phu, 1954
- Where
- Valley of Dien Bien Phu, northwest Vietnam, near the border with Laos
- War
- First Indochina War
- Decision
- General Henri Navarre orders an air-supplied base planted in a remote valley (Operation Castor, 20 November 1953) and then fights for it
- Warnings
- In November 1953 officers on Cogny's staff, General Gilles and air force commanders objected: airfields 350 km away, bad weather, flak
- Cost
- About 3,500 French Union dead and missing; 10,300 to 11,721 captured (sources differ); France left Indochina
In 1953, to stop a Viet Minh drive on Laos, General Henri Navarre chose to plant an air-supplied base in the plain of Dien Bien Phu, about 17 by 8 km. The objections came at once. Officers on the staff of General René Cogny, commander in the north, opposed it; General Jean Gilles, picked to lead the drop, had misgivings from Na San; and on 11 November air force commanders warned that the valley lay some 350 km from the Tonkin airfields, under bad weather. On 14 November Navarre went ahead. Cogny, his staff told an American consul, never approved the concept.13
By March some 10,800 men held a ring of strongpoints; around them General Vo Nguyen Giap gathered five divisions, 35,000 to 50,000 men by French figures. On 13 March his artillery opened fire and went first for the airstrip; the last positions fell on 7 May. France's armed forces ministry counts about 3,500 dead and missing and 10,300 prisoners, of whom about 3,300 came back; a written question in the National Assembly gives 11,721 captured and 3,290 returned. France then left Indochina. Myth vs fact: the battle is often told as a trap Navarre walked into, but the defense ministry's historians call the choice of site coherent and no trap on either side.14
Why it ranks here: Full marks for cost and certainty: the fall ended French rule in Indochina, and the objections are on record. Recognition and memory are a point lower, and clarity is 4 because French military historians still defend the site; it ties Hattin on points, recognition and cost and follows it as the younger blunder.
7 Gallipoli, 1915
- Where
- The Dardanelles and the Gallipoli peninsula, Ottoman Empire (today Turkey)
- War
- World War I, Dardanelles campaign
- Decision
- The Allies try to force the Dardanelles with ships alone, 19 February to 18 March 1915, before any army is ready to land
- Warnings
- The straits were known to be heavily mined and fortified; the naval attacks then cost the landings their surprise
- Cost
- Over 250,000 Allied casualties and over 58,000 dead (approximate); campaign abandoned in January 1916
In 1915 Britain and France planned to force the Dardanelles, reach Constantinople and perhaps knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war. The straits were well defended by minefields and forts, yet the first attempt was made by the fleet alone. The bombardment of the forts began on 19 February. On 18 March the fleet tried to force the narrows: the battleships Irresistible, Ocean and Bouvet sank on mines laid by the Ottoman minelayer Nusret, three more ships were badly damaged, and the attack was called off.15
The naval operation had warned the Ottomans where the danger lay, and any landing had lost the crucial element of surprise. When troops went ashore at Cape Helles and Anzac Cove on 25 April, five weeks later, the invasion was hastily planned and aimed at defenses it underestimated. The last troops left on 9 January 1916. More than 250,000 Allied troops became casualties and over 58,000 died, by the Gallipoli Association's approximate figures. Myth vs fact: Churchill later argued in The World Crisis that the forts had nearly run out of ammunition and one more push would have got through; the naval historian Christopher Bell, as Andrew Roberts sums him up, calls that case a mix of “truths, half-truths and dubious assertions.”16
Why it ranks here: Full marks for recognition, memory and certainty: Anzac Day keeps it alive in Australia, and Turkey celebrates 18 March as a day of victory. Clarity is only 3, because the blame is spread across ministers, admirals and generals, and cost 3, because it lost a campaign, not the war; it ties the Charge of the Light Brigade on points and recognition and goes ahead on cost.17
8 Charge of the Light Brigade, 1854
- Where
- The North Valley at Balaclava, Crimea
- War
- Crimean War
- Decision
- Lord Raglan's order to stop the Russians carrying away captured guns, carried by Captain Nolan and passed on by Lord Lucan, sends the Light Brigade against the wrong battery
- Warnings
- Lucan could not see the guns Raglan meant and asked Nolan which ones; Raglan's first order had been so vague that Lucan waited
- Cost
- About 260 of 673 men killed, wounded or captured, some 110 of them killed; 475 horses lost
On 25 October 1854 a Russian attack on Balaclava took Ottoman redoubts on the Causeway Heights and some British naval guns with them. Lord Raglan, the British commander, first ordered the cavalry forward so vaguely that Lord Lucan, commanding the Cavalry Division, waited for clarification. When Raglan saw the Russians hauling away the captured guns, he sent a second order: the cavalry was “to advance rapidly to the front, follow the enemy and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns.”18
From the valley floor Lucan could not see those guns and asked Captain Louis Nolan, who carried the order, which ones he meant. Nolan, angry, swept his arm: “There, my lord, is your enemy; there are your guns,” and motioned not at the heights but at the massed Russian battery at the end of the North Valley. Lucan passed the order to Lord Cardigan, and the Light Brigade rode down the valley under fire from three sides; Nolan was the first man killed. Of 673 men, about 260 were killed, wounded or captured, some 110 of them killed, and 475 horses were lost. Myth vs fact: Tennyson's “Some one had blunder'd” left the culprit open, and it still is: Raglan's wording, Nolan's gesture and Lucan's obedience all have their accusers, and the National Army Museum calls Nolan's last gallop an unsolved mystery.19
Why it ranks here: The clearest blunder on the list, with full marks for recognition, clarity, memory and certainty: one misread order sent a brigade down the wrong valley. But it changed nothing in the war, so cost is 1; it ties Gallipoli on points and recognition and falls behind it on cost.
9 The halt before Dunkirk, 1940
- Where
- The canal line south and west of Dunkirk, northern France
- War
- World War II, Battle of France
- Decision
- Hitler confirms Rundstedt’s halt on 24 May 1940 and keeps the panzers from crossing the canal line until 26 May, leaving the pocket to the Luftwaffe
- Warnings
- Guderian and other generals protested; the leading tanks were about 15 miles (24 km) from Dunkirk
- Cost
- 338,226 Allied troops evacuated between 27 May and 4 June; the British army survived to fight on
By 20 May 1940 German armor had reached the Channel and cut off the British Expeditionary Force in Flanders. On 23 May Ewald von Kleist reported that his panzer group had lost half its tanks, and Gerd von Rundstedt, commanding Army Group A, stopped it. When Hitler visited him on 24 May, Rundstedt, by his own war diary, proposed leaving the trapped Allies to the infantry; Hitler agreed and forbade the panzers to cross the canal line. Göring had promised that the Luftwaffe would finish the job. The leading tanks stood about 15 miles (24 km) from Dunkirk.20
Guderian protested, but Hitler stood firm. He let the tanks go again on 26 May, the day the British began Operation Dynamo. Between 27 May and 4 June 338,226 Allied soldiers were carried to England, and enough of the army came home for Churchill to persuade his cabinet to fight on. Sources disagree on whose decision it was: German generals later blamed Hitler alone, and Rundstedt claimed it was Hitler’s idea, though the order was issued on his advice. Myth vs fact: Hitler did not halt to spare the British in the hope of peace; HistoryNet calls that story false, and the record shows worn tanks, fear of another counterattack like Arras and Göring’s boasts.21
Why it ranks here: Britain kept its army, cost 4, and the evacuation is a living memory, memory 5; but the halt began with Rundstedt and the Luftwaffe shares the blame, so clarity of the blunder and certainty 4. It ties Gallipoli and the Charge of the Light Brigade on 42 and ranks below both on recognition.
10 Little Bighorn, 1876
- Where
- Little Bighorn River, Montana Territory
- War
- Great Sioux War of 1876 to 1877
- Decision
- George Armstrong Custer attacks at once on 25 June 1876 and splits the 7th Cavalry, keeping five companies, about 210 men, for himself
- Warnings
- His Crow and Arikara scouts warned of far more warriors than he expected; the village held 1,500 to 1,800 (modern estimates)
- Cost
- Custer’s five companies wiped out; 268 soldiers, civilians and scouts killed
In June 1876, as the 7th Cavalry followed an ever fresher trail up the Rosebud, its Crow and Arikara scouts saw signs of far more Indians than Custer expected, perhaps several thousand, and made no secret of their misgivings. Custer thought they exaggerated; his own estimate was 1,500 warriors, a force he judged his regiment could handle. At dawn on 25 June the scouts made out the village’s pony herd some 15 miles away; Custer could not. According to the Friends of the Little Bighorn Battlefield, his guide Mitch Bouyer warned him it was the largest village he had ever seen. Sure he had been spotted, Custer attacked that day, not on the 26th as planned.22
He split the regiment into four: the pack train, three companies under Benteen sent to scout, three under Reno to strike the village and five, about 210 men, under himself. The village held around 8,000 people with 1,500 to 1,800 warriors. Reno was routed and Custer’s battalion destroyed on the ridges; in all 268 soldiers, civilians and scouts died. Myth vs fact: the old charge that Custer simply disobeyed General Terry’s orders to win the glory is not settled; the Park Service’s handbook says a good case can be made for either side.23
Why it ranks here: Recognition and memory 5, and splitting the regiment before an enemy he had not counted is a clear error, clarity of the blunder 4. Most of the warriors had surrendered within a year, so cost 2, and with no survivor from Custer’s column certainty is 4. It ties Pickett’s Charge on 41 and ranks above it on recognition.24
11 Pickett’s Charge, 1863
- Where
- Cemetery Ridge, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania
- War
- American Civil War
- Decision
- Robert E. Lee sends about 12,000 to 12,500 men across a mile of open ground at the Union center on 3 July 1863
- Warnings
- Longstreet, by his memoirs, told Lee the work needed thirty thousand men and that no fifteen thousand could carry that field
- Cost
- 6,555 Confederate casualties in under an hour (American Battlefield Trust); Lee’s invasion of the North over
On 3 July 1863, the third day at Gettysburg, Lee decided to strike the Union center on Cemetery Ridge. James Longstreet, told to lead the attack, records in his memoirs that he argued against it: the point had been tried the day before by more men, the column would march a mile under massed artillery fire, and the work needed thirty thousand men. When Lee named a column of fifteen thousand, Longstreet answered that the fifteen thousand men who could make a successful assault over that field had never been arrayed for battle. Lee was impatient of listening.25
After a cannonade of nearly two hours, about 12,500 men of Pickett’s, Pettigrew’s and Trimble’s commands stepped off across a mile of open ground. Artillery and rifle fire tore them apart. The American Battlefield Trust counts 6,555 Confederate casualties in less than an hour, about half the men engaged, against some 1,500 Union killed and wounded, and Lee told a general that “this has all been my fault.” The next day he began his retreat to Virginia. Myth vs fact: after the war Jubal Early and other Virginians blamed Longstreet with invented charges, a campaign that also cleared Lee; Lee’s own words point the other way.26
Why it ranks here: A plain decision taken over the protest of the man ordered to carry it out, but that protest is known mainly from Longstreet’s memoirs, written decades later by a general under attack, so clarity of the blunder 4; the war went on almost two more years, cost 3. It ties the Little Bighorn on 41 and ranks below it on recognition.
12 Cannae, 216 BC
- Where
- Plain by the Aufidus river, Apulia, southern Italy
- War
- Second Punic War
- Decision
- Terentius Varro gives battle on the open plain and packs the maniples so that the depth of each many times exceeds its front
- Warnings
- His fellow consul Aemilius Paullus opposed fighting on flat ground where Hannibal’s cavalry was stronger (Polybius)
- Cost
- Roman army destroyed; 48,200 dead (Livy, our sum) to about 70,000 (Polybius)
In 216 BC Hannibal seized the Roman supply depot at Cannae in Apulia. The Senate, by Polybius’ account, decided to give battle and sent both consuls to the front with about 80,000 infantry and more than 6,000 cavalry, against some 40,000 foot and 10,000 horse. The consuls commanded on alternate days. Aemilius Paullus was against fighting on that flat, treeless country, where Hannibal’s stronger cavalry would tell. Terentius Varro advanced anyway, in spite of his colleague’s strong protests.27
On the day of battle Varro packed the maniples closer together than usual, “making the depth of each many times exceed its front.” Hannibal let his Gauls and Spaniards bend back under the weight while his African infantry waited on both flanks and his cavalry fell on the rear, closing the legions in on every side. Polybius counts about 70,000 dead and some 10,000 captured; Livy gives 45,500 infantry and 2,700 cavalry killed, 48,200 by our sum. Both are ancient figures. Myth vs fact: the tradition blames the rash Varro alone, but the battle was the Senate’s decision, and WarHistory.org argues that Varro, a new man with no powerful descendants, became the designated scapegoat.28
Why it ranks here: The most famous encirclement in history, memory 5, and the protest of Aemilius Paullus is on record, so clarity of the blunder 4; not 5, because the decision to fight came from the Senate and much of the result was Hannibal’s skill. Rome went on to win the war, cost 3. It ties Agincourt and the advance to the Yalu on 40, and goes ahead of Agincourt as the older battle and of the Yalu on recognition.
13 Agincourt, 1415
- Where
- Near the village of Azincourt, about 75 km south of Calais, northern France
- War
- Hundred Years’ War
- Decision
- The French leaders attack Henry V’s army head-on across a narrow, muddy field on 25 October 1415
- Warnings
- The Constable d’Albret and Marshal Boucicault wanted to surround the English and starve them; younger nobles overruled them (World History Encyclopedia)
- Cost
- About 6,000 to 7,000 French dead (higher estimates up to 13,000), the Constable among them
In August 1415 Henry V invaded Normandy with around 10,000 men and took Harfleur after a five-week siege, but the fighting and dysentery cut his army to 6,000 or 7,000, and he set off for Calais. The Constable of France, Charles d’Albret, gathered an army that World History Encyclopedia puts at around 20,000 and blocked his road. The Constable and Marshal Boucicault wanted to surround the hungry English and starve them into submission. Younger and impetuous nobles overruled them and chose a frontal attack.29
On 25 October the French had to come at Henry across about 1,000 yards of open ground between two woods. Recently plowed fields and overnight rain had turned it into a sea of mud; the mounted charges broke on the archers’ arrows and stakes, and the men-at-arms who followed on foot piled up in the press. Around 7,000 French died by World History Encyclopedia’s figure, almost 6,000 by HISTORY’s, the Constable among them, against a few hundred English dead. Myth vs fact: the odds of five to one told in legend are doubtful; the historian Anne Curry, working from the muster rolls, suggests some 8,500 English against about 12,000 French.30
Why it ranks here: Recognition 4 and memory 5, kept alive by Shakespeare’s Henry V, and the overruled advice is on record, so clarity of the blunder 4; not 5, as Henry’s ground and archers did as much as the French decision. France lost much of its nobility but won the war in the end, cost 3, and the size of the armies is still argued, certainty 4. It ties Cannae on points, recognition and cost and follows it as the younger battle.31
14 The advance to the Yalu, 1950
- Where
- North Korea, from the Ch’ongch’on River to the Chosin Reservoir
- War
- Korean War
- Decision
- Douglas MacArthur drives for the Yalu with Eighth Army and X Corps 80 miles apart and renews the offensive on 24 November 1950
- Warnings
- Zhou Enlai’s warning through India’s ambassador on 3 October; Chinese attacks from 25 October; the Marine commander’s doubts of 15 November
- Cost
- Chinese counteroffensive by about 200,000 men against Eighth Army and 100,000 against X Corps; all UN gains in North Korea lost by the end of December
On 3 October 1950 Zhou Enlai told India’s ambassador, K. M. Panikkar, that China would send troops to defend North Korea if US forces crossed the 38th parallel (UN forces, in the first report from London), but not if only South Koreans did. Eighth Army crossed on 9 October. At Wake Island on 15 October Truman asked MacArthur about the chances of Chinese intervention. “Very little,” MacArthur answered: no more than 50,000 to 60,000 could cross the Yalu.32
From 25 October Chinese troops battered South Korean units and the US 8th Cavalry near Unsan. MacArthur pressed on with his two forces 80 miles apart; on 15 November the Marine commander, O. P. Smith, wrote that a winter campaign in those mountains was too much to ask. The final offensive opened on 24 November. The Chinese, who had slipped in largely undetected, struck Eighth Army the next night and X Corps two nights later, some 200,000 men against the one and 100,000 against the other; on 28 November MacArthur reported “an entirely new war.” December saw the loss of all UN gains in North Korea. Myth vs fact: the blame usually falls on MacArthur alone, but the State Department had Zhou’s warning the same day and was itself asking its embassies whether China meant it, and Truman heard MacArthur’s assurance in person.33
Why it ranks here: The warning and MacArthur’s answer are in the State Department’s own records, so clarity of the blunder and certainty 5; it lost North Korea, cost 4. Far less known outside the United States than the Chosin battle it led to, it has recognition 3, which puts it below Cannae and Agincourt, also on 40.
15 Singapore, 1942
- Where
- Singapore Island, at the tip of the Malay Peninsula
- War
- World War II, Malayan campaign
- Decision
- Arthur Percival expects the Japanese in the northeast, puts the fresh British 18th Division there and spreads the rest thinly along the coast
- Warnings
- Wavell judged on 20 January 1942 that the landing would come in the northwest and wanted the 18th Division there
- Cost
- Surrender on 15 February 1942; about 80,000 to 85,000 men captured
On 31 January 1942 the last British and Commonwealth troops crossed from Malaya to Singapore Island, whose defenses had been built against attack from the sea. Its north coast had no fixed defenses. Visiting on 20 January, General Sir Archibald Wavell had judged that the Japanese would land in the northwest, where the Johore Strait was narrowest, and wanted the fresh British 18th Division there. Percival strongly disagreed and expected the main blow in the east. He sent the 18th Division to the northeast, spread the rest thinly along the coast and left the northwest to two Australian brigades.34
On the night of 8 February some 13,000 Japanese crossed against about 3,000 Australians in the northwest; the high command took it for a diversion and sent too little help. On 15 February, penned in around the city with water desperately short, Percival surrendered. HistoryNet counts 80,000 captured; Taylor Downing gives about 85,000, beaten by a Japanese force of about 23,000. Churchill called it “the worst disaster and largest capitulation in British history.” Myth vs fact: the popular story blames great guns that could only point out to sea; the National Army Museum puts the problem in their ammunition, mostly armor-piercing shells meant for warships and of little use against infantry, and HistoryNet notes the shortage of high-explosive rounds.35
Why it ranks here: Famous and well recorded, recognition 4 and certainty 5, it cost an army and a fortress, cost 4; clarity of the blunder is only 3, because the bare north shore and Malaya’s weak air and naval defense were settled before Percival placed his troops. It ties Tannenberg, a close call, on 39 and makes the list on cost.
How we chose and ranked these blunders
We counted a blunder only when a commander made a decision on the battlefield or in a campaign that historians broadly agree could and should have been made differently, and that decision turned a hard position into a disaster. The core of the ranking is how clear and avoidable that blunder was, not how large the defeat was. Bad luck does not count, and neither does simply losing to a better enemy, which is why Pearl Harbor, a surprise attack the Japanese planned and carried out without being detected, is left out. Political decisions do not count either: starting a war, such as the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, is a choice of governments, so we score only what commanders did once the fighting began, as at Stalingrad. The defeats with the highest death tolls are ranked in our guide to the deadliest battles in history, and the great traps, seen from the side that laid them, in the greatest ambushes in history.36
We considered 25 candidates and scored each one from 1 to 5 on five criteria. Recognition counts three times, because this page answers the question of which military blunders are the most famous; the clarity of the blunder, its cost and memory count twice, and certainty counts once. Many blunders are told by a single chronicler or by men writing to clear their own names, so we marked certainty down wherever the decision or the warning rests on one late or partisan source:
- Recognition (×3). 5 if the blunder is known far beyond military history and appears on most published lists of military blunders, 1 if only specialists know it.
- Clarity of the blunder (×2). How clear and avoidable the blunder was: 5 if one identifiable decision by the commander, taken against advice or warnings available at the time, is what historians broadly name as the cause of the disaster; 4 if the blunder is clear but shares the blame with the enemy's skill or a second cause; 3 if historians are divided or the blunder was one of several causes; 2 if the defeat owed more to bad luck or a stronger enemy than to any choice; 1 if there was no real alternative or the story is a legend. A 2 or a 1 puts an entry out of scope.
- Cost (×2). What the blunder cost: 5 if it lost a war, a state or the army on which the war turned, 1 if it cost little beyond the field.
- Memory (×2). 5 if it is still a living memory (a poem, a film, a remembrance day, a saying), 1 if it is forgotten.
- Certainty (×1). 5 if the decision, the warnings and the losses are confirmed by records or independent sources, 1 if they rest on one late source or are disputed.
The list is ranked by total score, not by date. Ties go to the better-known blunder, then to the one that cost more, then to the older one. The scores are our editorial judgment, made on the evidence in the sources below, and the table shows every one of them, so you can see exactly why Cannae, first on an earlier version of this page, is now twelfth: Polybius records that Aemilius Paullus opposed fighting on the open plain and that the maniples were packed many times deeper than their front, but he also says the decision to give battle came from the Senate, much of the result was Hannibal's skill, and Rome went on to win the war.
| Rank | Name | Recognition ×3 | Clarity of the blunder ×2 | Cost ×2 | Memory ×2 | Certainty ×1 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Stalingrad | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 48 |
| 2 | Russia | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 47 |
| 3 | Teutoburg Forest | 5 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 46 |
| 4 | Arnhem | 5 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 44 |
| 5 | Hattin | 4 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 43 |
| 6 | Dien Bien Phu | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 5 | 43 |
| 7 | Gallipoli | 5 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 42 |
| 8 | Charge of the Light Brigade | 5 | 5 | 1 | 5 | 5 | 42 |
| 9 | The halt before Dunkirk | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 4 | 42 |
| 10 | Little Bighorn | 5 | 4 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 41 |
| 11 | Pickett's Charge | 4 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 5 | 41 |
| 12 | Cannae | 4 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 40 |
| 13 | Agincourt | 4 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 40 |
| 14 | The advance to the Yalu | 3 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 40 |
| 15 | Singapore | 4 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 39 |
Close calls
Five blunders came close and did not make the fifteen:
Tannenberg, 1914. Samsonov’s Second Army marched out of touch with Rennenkampf’s First, and Russian headquarters sent orders by open radio, which HISTORY, quoting the historian Jay Lockenour, calls the biggest Russian error. The army was surrounded and destroyed, and Hindenburg’s order of the day of 31 August claimed more than 90,000 prisoners. The blame is shared and Russia fought on, so it ties Singapore on 39 and misses on cost.37
Isandlwana, 1879. Lord Chelmsford pitched a camp without drawing its wagons into a laager and took part of his force away to find the Zulus. Over 20,000 warriors fell on it and killed most of its 1,700 defenders. The camp was meant to be temporary and Britain still won the war, so it scores 38.38
First day of the Somme, 1916. Haig’s attack rested on a seven-day bombardment meant to cut the German wire; many shells were defective, much wire stayed uncut, and on 1 July 1916 the British Army suffered 57,000 casualties, the bloodiest day in its history. Historians still argue how far that was a blunder rather than the price of trench warfare, and the day decided nothing, so it scores 37.39
Syracuse, 413 BC. As the beaten Athenians prepared to sail home, the moon was eclipsed, and Nicias, “addicted to superstition” in Thucydides’ words, refused to discuss leaving until thrice nine days had passed. The fleet and the army were then destroyed, and few of many returned home. It is one of the clearest blunders of antiquity, but few beyond readers of Thucydides know it, recognition 3, and it scores 37.40
Adrianople, 378. The western emperor Gratian wrote asking Valens to wait for his army, and the cavalry commander Victor urged the same; Valens, urged on by courtiers who wanted Gratian to have no share in the victory, attacked the Goths at once. Ammianus Marcellinus writes that barely a third of the army escaped. He is the only full account and few know the name, so it scores 36.41
Blunder or bad luck? What we left out
Some famous disasters are missing on purpose. Lake Trasimene in 217 BC was above all a superbly laid ambush, not simply a Roman error. At Pearl Harbor, American unpreparedness was real, but the US Army's official history describes a Japanese plan synchronized for the greatest advantage of surprise, with a carrier force that crossed 3,000 miles of the Pacific without being detected. The invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 was a government's decision to start a war, which this list does not score. Manzikert, on our older version of this page, dropped out because the Byzantine collapse owed more to the rearguard of Andronikos Doukas leaving the field than to the emperor's own choices, and Isandlwana and Tannenberg now sit among the close calls.42
The common threads are easier to see. Commanders ignored or explained away warnings, as at Teutoburg, Arnhem, Singapore and on the road to the Yalu. They held on when they should have moved, as Hitler did at Stalingrad and Napoleon in Moscow, or moved when they should have held, as Guy of Lusignan did at Hattin. They split their forces in front of an enemy they had not counted, as at Little Bighorn. And they gave or received orders so vague that brave men obeyed them to destruction, as at Balaclava.
